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BEHAVIORAL EQUIVALENCE OF EXTENSIVE GAME STRUCTURES
PIERPAOLO BATTIGALLI, PAOLO LEONETTI, AND FABIO MACCHERONI
Abstract. Two extensive game structures with imperfect information are said to be behav-
iorally equivalent if they share the same map (up to relabelings) from profiles of structurally
reduced strategies to induced terminal paths. We show that this is the case if and only
if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary trans-
formations, commonly known as “Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves” and “Coalescing
Moves/Sequential Agent Splitting.”
1. Introduction
Fix a player, viz. player i, in the extensive-form representation of a finite game. Say that
two strategies s′i and s
′′
i of player i are behaviorally equivalent if they are consistent with (do
not prevent from being reached) the same collection of information sets of player i and behave
in the same way at such information sets. Two strategies s′i and s
′′
i are realization-equivalent
if, for every given strategy profile s−i of the opponents (including the chance player), s
′
i and
s′′i induce the same play path, or terminal node (of course, the induced terminal node may
depend on s−i). Kuhn proved that these two equivalence relations coincide, see [15, Theorem
1]. Intuitively, two strategies of player i are equivalent in this sense, if they respond in the same
way to information about other players, but may respond in different ways to past moves of i.
This corresponds to a notion of “forward planning,” such as planning the sequence of actions to
be taken in a one-person game (without chance moves). For this reason, some authors call “plan
of action” such an equivalence class of strategies, cf. [19, Section 6.4] and [25]. Several authors
studying the foundations of game theory put forward solution concepts that do not distinguish
between behaviorally equivalent strategies. Such solution concepts rely on the following notion
of sequential best reply. For each of his information sets, player i has a probabilistic belief
about the strategies of the opponents and the resulting system of beliefs satisfies the rules
of conditional probability whenever they apply. A strategy s⋆i is a sequential best reply
to such system of beliefs if, for each information set of i reachable under s⋆i , there is no
alternative strategy that yields a higher expected utility given the belief at such information
set. Different notions of “extensive-form rationalizability” put forward and applied in the
last four decades (e.g., Pearce [20], Ben Porath [5], Battigalli [2], Battigalli and Siniscalchi
[4]) rely on this notion of sequential best reply and therefore do not distinguish between
behaviorally equivalent strategies. These solution concepts have been rigorously justified by
explicit and formal assumptions about strategic reasoning. See, for example, the surveys of
Battigalli and Bonanno [3], and Dekel and Siniscalchi [8], the textbook of Perea [22], and
JEL code. C72.
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the relevant references therein for rigorous and transparent epistemic justifications of these
solution concepts.1
Since behavioral and realization equivalence coincide, if two strategies are behaviorally
equivalent, they are necessarily payoff equivalent; but it is easy to show by example that
the converse is not true (see below). Thus, behavioral equivalence, sequential best reply,
and the related solution concepts are not normal-form invariant. It is also clear from the
definition of behavioral equivalence and its coincidence with realization equivalence that the
only relevant part of a game in extensive form that matters to ascertain such equivalence is the
game structure (that is, the game tree with the information structure), not the map from
terminal nodes to consequences, or payoffs. Call a class of behaviorally equivalent strategies a
structurally reduced strategy. A transformation of a game structure preserves behavioral
equivalence if, up to relabeling, the new game structure has the same set of structurally reduced
strategies for each player, the same set of terminal nodes, and the same map from profiles of
structurally reduced strategies to terminal nodes as the initial game structure. In this case,
we say that two game structures are behaviorally equivalent.
As anticipated, the notions of realization equivalence and behavioral equivalence are related
to, but distinct from payoff equivalence of strategies in a game, and normal-form equivalence
of two games in extensive form. The latter relations can be defined only for fully specified
games whereby each terminal node is associated with a corresponding profile of payoffs. Two
behaviorally equivalent strategies are necessarily payoff equivalent, that is, independently of
how the co-players’ behavior is fixed, they yield the same profile of payoffs. But the possibility
of ties between terminal nodes implies that the converse is not true. The standard notion of
equivalence between games requires the same map (up to relabeling) between profiles of classes
of payoff equivalent strategies and payoff profiles. If we assign the same payoff functions (up
to relabeling of terminal nodes) to two behaviorally equivalent game structures, we obtain two
games in extensive form that are equivalent in the (less demanding) traditional sense, that
is, they have the same reduced normal form. But such traditional equivalence may also hold
between non behaviorally equivalent games. For example, a (non trivial) 2-person game with
perfect information and a game with (essentially) simultaneous moves with the same normal
form are not behaviorally equivalent.
Since there are well-known and relevant solution concepts that are not normal-form invari-
ant, but yield the same solutions (up to relabeling) for games with the same structure and the
same payoff functions, we find it interesting to provide a characterization of behavioral equiv-
alence by means of invariant transformations. We consider a class of extensive-form structures
allowing a direct representation of simultaneous moves whereby more than one player may be
active at a given node; see, e.g., [19, Section 6.3.2]. Therefore, besides the standard transfor-
mation of “Interchanging” essentially simultaneous, but formally sequential moves, we apply a
“Simultanizing” transformation that makes such moves truly simultaneous. We also consider
the standard transformation of “Coalescing Moves” and its inverse, that is, “Sequential Agent
1There are also extensive-form refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, such as Reny’s explicable
equilibrium [24] that do not distinguish between behaviorally equivalent strategies.
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Splitting” (see the examples below). With this, we prove the following result: Two finite game
structures G and G′ are behaviorally equivalent if and only if there is a sequence of trans-
formations of the “Interchanging/Simultanizing” kind and “Coalescing Moves” kind and their
inverses that connects G with G′.
Example 1. Consider player 1 in the extensive game structures G and G′ represented in
Figure 1. Neither the consequence function nor the preference relations over the set of ter-
minal nodes {z1, z2, z3} are specified. In particular, the “normal-form” representations will
be defined as maps from strategy profiles to terminal nodes. It has been argued that player
1 should regard G and G′ as representing “essentially” the same situation, if his preferences
over {z1, z2, z3} are the same. In particular, strategies x.a and x.b are behaviorally equivalent
and the set {x.a, x.b} gives the structurally reduced strategy x, representing the “plan” of
reaching z1, whereas y.a (resp. y.b) corresponds to the plan of reaching z2 (resp. z3). Thus,
G and G′ have isomorphic sets (of cardinality 3) of structurally reduced strategies, where the
isomorphism preserves the map from reduced strategies to terminal nodes.
1
z1 1
z2 z3
x y
a b
1
z1
z2 z3
x
a b
Figure 1. Example of Coalescing Moves.
Example 2. The two game structures in Figure 2 feature imperfect information. In both
cases players 1 and 2 move sequentially and the second mover cannot observe the move of the
first, which is represented by joining with a dashed line the nodes where the second mover is
active, but the order of moves is interchanged.
1
2 2
z3 z4z1 z2
x y
a ba b
2
1 1
z2 z4z1 z3
a b
x yx y
Figure 2. Example of Interchanging/Simultanizing.
It has been argued that these two structures represent “essentially” the same situation.
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1.1. Literature. The standard literature on game equivalence aims at characterizing classes
of games with the same reduced normal form by means of invariant transformations. The
first work on game equivalence is Thompson [28], who defines four transformations commonly
known as “Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves,” “Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent Split-
ting,” “Addition of a Superfluous Move,” and “Inflation/Deflation.” Relying on the simplifica-
tion of Krentel, McKinsey, and Quine [13] and the extensive-game model proposed by Kuhn
[14], he shows that, up to relabelings, two finite games share the same reduced normal form
if and only if each extensive form representation can be transformed into the other through a
finite number of applications of these transformations (see also [7]).
A few later contributions extended Thompson’s work. In particular, Kohlberg and Mertens
[12] extend the above result to games with chance moves, proposing two additional transfor-
mations which are, essentially, modified versions of Coalescing Moves and Addition of Super-
fluous Moves for the chance player. They argue that all the “strategic features” are unchanged
through the application of these transformations. Elmes and Reny [9] point out that one
of these transformations, Inflation/Deflation, does not preserve the perfect recall property.
Hence, given a modified version of the Addition of a Superfluous Move transformation, they
show that two extensive form games with the same reduced normal form can be transformed
into each other without using the unwanted transformation, and preserving the perfect recall
property. This is, in our view, conceptually appealing, because whether players have perfect
or imperfect recall should be part of the description of their personal traits (like their sub-
jective preferences), not of the objective rules of the game. Such rules should describe the
objective “flow” of information to players. Assuming that players are necessarily informed of
the actions they just chose, the objectively accumulated “stock” of information is represented
by information partitions with the perfect recall property, see also Section 2.3. Other notions
of game equivalence have been studied in the literature. For example, Hoshi and Isaac [11]
extend Thompson’s result to the case of games with unawareness. Bonanno [6] investigates
the notion of game equivalence which arises from the iterated application of Interchanging of
Simultaneous Moves only, showing that the resulting equivalence classes correspond to set-
theoretic reductions. Goranko [10] takes a linguistic approach, gives an axiomatization of the
algebra of games and defines canonical forms so that every game term is provably equivalent
to a minimal canonical one. Lastly, van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, and Enqvist [29] look at
equivalence from the perspective of the players’ power for controlling outcomes.
Compared to most of this literature, we differ in two ways. First, we consider a differ-
ent set of transformations, which just apply to the extensive form structure, irrespective of
the outcome function.2 Second, our formal language is somewhat different. In particular,
for us actions, rather than nodes, are the primitive terms; furthermore, we provide a direct
representation of simultaneity. The latter is in principle important, because two games with
different sequences of “essentially simultaneous” moves are not necessarily viewed as equivalent
by the players. For example, only the first mover can be afraid (or hopeful) of being spied
on. More generally, we can cleanly represent incomplete information about the order of moves
2In this respect, our work is similar to Bonanno [6].
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and the information structure as in [21], whereas the representation à la Kuhn [15] would be
cumbersome.
2. Preliminaries on Game structures
2.1. Preliminary Notation. Let (X,≤) be a finite partially ordered set, i.e., a nonempty
finite set X with a binary relation ≤ contained in X × X which is transitive, reflexive, and
antisymmetric. As usual, given x, y ∈ X, we write x < y as an abbreviation of x ≤ y and
x 6= y. We let [x, y] represent the order interval {v ∈ X : x ≤ v ≤ y} (hence [x, y] 6= ∅ if
and only if x ≤ y) and denote the immediate predecessor relation by ≪, that is, x≪ y with
x 6= y if and only if [x, y] = {x, y}. A finite partially ordered set (X,≤) is said to be a tree
whenever there exists a (necessarily unique) minimum element e, which is called the root of
the tree, and for each x ∈ X the order interval [e, x] is totally ordered.
Given a nonempty set S, we denote by 2S the power set of S and by (Part(S),≤) the
collection of partitions of S. The latter is partially ordered by the refinement relation, that
is, P ≤ P ′ for some partitions P,P ′ of S whenever, for each P ∈ P, there exists a sub-
collection {P ′i : i ∈ I} ⊆ P
′ such that P =
⋃
i∈I P
′
i . In addition, we represent the set of finite
sequences of elements from S by
S<N0 :=
⋃
n∈N0
Sn,
where S0 := {∅} is the singleton containing the empty sequence (here N0 and N stand, respec-
tively, for the set of nonnegative integers and positive integers; in particular 0 ∈ N0). Accord-
ingly, we define a partial order  on S<N0 such that x  y if and only if x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S
n
is a prefix of y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ S
m, that is, if and only if x = ∅ or 0 < n ≤ m and xi = yi for
all positive integers i ≤ n. Note that ∅  x for all x ∈ S<N0 , every nonempty order interval
[x, y] is finite, hence totally ordered, and the set {v : x ≺ v  y} has a minimum provided
that x ≺ y; cf. [1, pp. 144-145]. Thus (S<N0 ,) is a tree. Here, the immediate predecessor
relation is denoted by ≺≺.
Recall that a complete lattice is a partially ordered set such that all subsets have both a
supremum and an infimum. In particular, a complete lattice admits a greatest and a least
element. Accordingly, we have the following result (we omit details).
Lemma 1. Fix a finite set X. Then the partially ordered set (Part(X),≤) is a complete lattice.
In particular, for each nonempty collection {Pj : j ∈ J} of partitions of X, sup {Pj : j ∈ J}
exists in Part(X).
Lastly, given nonempty sets X,Y,Z, a correspondence ϕ : X ։ Y is a map that associates
each x ∈ X with some possibly empty subset of Y . With this, for each y ∈ Y , we define the
inverse image of y as ϕ−1(y) := {x ∈ X : y ∈ ϕ(x)} (hence, ϕ−1 is a correspondence from
Y to X). Given another correspondence ψ : Y ։ Z, the composition ψ ◦ ϕ : X ։ Z is the
correspondence defined by (ψ◦ϕ)(x) :=
⋃
y∈ϕ(x) ψ(y) for all x ∈ X. Note that correspondences
can be equivalently reinterpreted as binary relations (see also the comments in Section 4).
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2.2. Extensive game structures. Let G be the collection of all extensive game structures
G with imperfect information and perfect recall represented by tuples
〈I, H¯, (Ai,Hi)i∈I〉, (1)
where each primitive component will be described below (this is inspired by [19]). For brevity,
we will often write “game” instead of “game structure.” Hereafter, all extensive game structures
are assumed to be finite and without chance moves.
2.2.1. Players. I is a nonempty finite set of players.
2.2.2. Actions. For each i ∈ I, Ai is a nonempty finite set of potentially feasible actions
which can be chosen by player i. Then, we let
A :=
⋃
∅6=J⊆I
(∏
i∈J
Ai
)
denote the set of action profiles of subsets of players.
2.2.3. Histories. H¯ is the finite set of histories, i.e., a finite tree contained in (A<N0 ,)
such that ∅ ∈ H¯ and closed under the immediate predecessor relation, that is, if x ≺≺ y in
(A<N0 ,) and y ∈ H¯, then x ∈ H¯. We refer to elements of H¯ as “histories” or “nodes” as
convenient. (Hence, each node in H¯ is a chain of profile of actions in A.) With this, H¯ can
be partitioned in the sets of terminal histories Z and non-terminal histories H := H¯ \ Z.
From the previous elements, we derive an active-player correspondence I(·) : H ։ I
that associates with each h ∈ H the nonempty subset I(h) ⊆ I such that
∀a ∈ A, (h, a) ∈ H¯ =⇒ a ∈
∏
i∈I(h)
Ai.
In addition, we assume that, for each i ∈ I, there is some h ∈ H such that i ∈ I(h), that is,
Hi := {h ∈ H : i ∈ I(h)} 6= ∅.
2.2.4. Information structure. For each player i ∈ I, Hi is a partition of Hi, called the infor-
mation partition of i.
Moreover, we assume that the profile (Fi : H ։ Ai)i∈I of feasibility correspondences
defined, for each i ∈ I, by
∀h ∈ H, Fi(h) := projAi
{
a ∈
∏
j∈I(h)Aj : (h, a) ∈ H¯
}
satisfies the following properties:
⋄ For each player i ∈ I and each non-terminal history h ∈ H, if Fi(h) 6= ∅, then
|Fi(h)| ≥ 2; in the latter case, we say that i is active, otherwise he
3 is inactive.
3The male pronouns (he, him, his) are used throughout this paper. We hope this won’t be interpreted by
anyone as an attempt to exclude females from the game or to imply their exclusion. Centuries of use have
made these pronouns neutral, and we feel their use provides for clear and concise written text.
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⋄ For each non-terminal history h ∈ H, the feasibility conditions of distinct players are
logically independent, that is,
∀a ∈
∏
i∈I(h)Ai, h ≺≺ (h, a) ⇐⇒ a ∈
∏
i∈I(h) Fi(h).
Hence, we write (h, a) := (a1, . . . , an, a) whenever h = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ H; in particular,
(h, a) = (a) if h = ∅.
⋄ For each player i ∈ I, Fi is Hi-measurable, that is,
∀hi ∈ Hi,∀h, h
′ ∈ hi, Fi(h) = Fi(h
′).
Each element hi ∈ Hi is interpreted as an information set of player i, i.e., a maximal
subset of non-terminal histories that player i is not able to distinguish. With this,
it makes sense to write Fi(di) for each nonempty subset di ⊆ hi. Note that, at an
information set, player imight not know who his active opponents are and their feasible
actions.
⋄ For notational convenience, we assume that different information sets are associated
with disjoint sets of feasible actions, that is,
∀hi,h
′
i ∈ Hi, hi 6= h
′
i =⇒ Fi(hi) ∩ Fi(h
′
i) = ∅. (2)
Lastly, for each history h ∈ H¯, let Z(h) := {z ∈ Z : h  z} be the set of terminal histories
which follow h and, for each nonempty U ⊆ H¯, write Z(U) :=
⋃
h∈U Z(h). Also, for each
information set hi ∈ Hi and feasible action a
⋆
i ∈ Fi(hi), define the set of terminal histories
which follow hi and a
⋆
i as
Z(hi, a
⋆
i ) :=
⋃
h∈hi
⋃
a−i∈F−i(h)
Z((h, (a⋆i , a−i))).
The following example illustrates and explains our formalism.
Example 3. Consider the extensive game structure represented in Figure 3.
1,2
z2
z3
z1
3
z4 z5
(u, r)
(d, r)
(u, ℓ)
(d, ℓ)
x y
Figure 3. An example of extensive game structure.
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Here, the set of players is I = {1, 2, 3} and the set of feasible actions are A1 = {u, d},
A2 = {ℓ, r}, and A3 = {x, y}. The set of histories H¯ is partitioned into the set of terminal
histories Z = {((u, ℓ)), ((u, r)), ((d, r)), ((d, ℓ), x), ((d, ℓ), y)} and non-terminal histories H =
{∅, h}, where h := ((d, ℓ)). In addition, the feasibility correspondences satisfy Fi(∅) = Ai
and Fi(h) = ∅ for each i ∈ {1, 2}, F3(∅) = ∅, and F3(h) = A3. Lastly, all informations sets
are singletons, so that Hi = {{∅}} for each i ∈ {1, 2}, and H3 = {{h}}. Despite this, the
game does not feature perfect information in the usual sense because it contains simultaneous
moves by player 1 and 2 at the root.
2.3. Perfect recall. Game structures G ∈ G have to satisfy perfect recall, see [1, Definition
6.5]. This means that each player always remembers everything he knew and did earlier. Thus
information sets represent the “stock” of information objectively given to a player irrespective
of his cognitive abilities, which are personal features and not part of the rules of the game.4
In particular, perfect recall implies that, in each information set, two distinct histories are
unrelated, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I,∀hi ∈ Hi,∀h, h
′ ∈ hi, h  h
′ =⇒ h = h′. (3)
The violation of (3) is commonly known as “absent-mindedness” (see [23]).
2.4. Z-reduced normal form. For each player i ∈ I, let Si be his set of strategies, that is,
Si :=
∏
hi∈Hi
Fi(hi).
Similarly, S :=
∏
i∈I Si denotes the set of strategy profiles. Each strategy profile s ∈ S
determines a unique terminal history z ∈ Z.5 We denote this path function by
ζ : S → Z.
Accordingly, for each game structure G = 〈I, H¯, (Ai,Hi)i∈I〉 ∈ G, we define its Z-normal
form by
nZ(G) := 〈I, (Si)i∈I , Z, ζ〉.
Note that the Z-normal form is not graphical per se, but rather represents the game G by
means of a kind of matrix.
Definition 1. Fix G ∈ G as in (1) and a player i ∈ I. Two strategies si, s
′
i ∈ Si are
behaviorally equivalent, written as si
i
∼ s′i, if
∀s−i ∈ S−i, ζ(si, s−i) = ζ(s
′
i, s−i),
where S−i :=
∏
j∈I\{i} Sj .
4We could instead describe explicitly the information flows implied by the rules of the game (as, for example,
in Myerson [17]), but this would make notation heavier and proofs more convoluted.
5Players who are active at ∅ determine a unique history h1 ∈ H of length 1; if h1 ∈ Z we are done,
otherwise players who are active at h1 determine a unique history h2 ∈ H of length 2; this is repeated only a
finite number of times, hence the algorithm terminates.
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It is worth noting that this is the classical definition of realization-equivalent strategies.
However, as proved by Kuhn in [15, Theorem 1], this coincides with the condition that strate-
gies si, s
′
i ∈ Si do not prevent from being reached the same collection of information sets in
Hi and behave in the same way at such information sets.
Since
i
∼ is an equivalence relation on Si, we can define the quotient space
Si := Si/
i
∼ .
Elements of Si are structurally reduced strategies of player i, that is, classes of behaviorally
equivalent strategies of i. Similarly, we set S :=
∏
i∈I Si and denote the representative of each
s ∈ S by s• ∈ S.
For each G ∈ G, we let its Z-reduced normal form be
rnZ(G) := 〈I, (Si)i∈I , Z, ζ˜〉,
where ζ˜ : S → Z is the map defined by ζ˜(s•) = ζ(s).
With this, we have all the ingredients to define the notion of behavioral equivalence for
game structures.
Definition 2. Two extensive game structures G,G′ ∈ G are behaviorally equivalent if they
share the same Z-reduced normal form up to isomorphisms6 (i.e., rnZ(G) ≃ rnZ(G
′)).
In particular, the two game structures in Example 1 and the two game structures in Example
2 are, respectively, behaviorally equivalent.
3. Invariant Transformations
We introduce the notion of invariant transformation:
Definition 3. A correspondence T : G ։ G is said to be an invariant transformation if
dom(T ) := {G ∈ G : T (G) 6= ∅} 6= ∅ and G is behaviorally equivalent to G′ for all G ∈ dom(T )
and G′ ∈ T (G). The family of invariant transformations will be denoted by T .
To define the basic invariant transformations, we first need to introduce the notions of
“controlling” and “dominating” sets. Intuitively, these sets are collections of histories in the
same information set of an active player i that, in a sense, control suitable paths which are
successors of a given set of histories h ∈ H.
3.1. Controlling and dominating sets. Fix a game structure G ∈ G as defined in (1).
Definition 4. Given a player i ∈ I and two information sets hi,h
′
i ∈ Hi, we say that h
′
i
controls hi, written
hi ≪i h
′
i ,
whenever there exists a feasible action a⋆i ∈ Fi(hi) such that
Z(hi, a
⋆
i ) = Z(h
′
i). (4)
6More explicitly, there exist a bijection fi : Si → S
′
i for each i ∈ I and a bijection g : Z → Z
′ such that
g(ζ˜(s)) = ζ˜′(f(s)) for all s ∈ S ; here f(s) is the structurally reduced strategy profile (fi(si))i∈I ∈ S
′.
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In other words, given perfect recall, hi ≪i h
′
i means that h
′
i follows hi in the directed forest
of information sets of player i,7 and the only thing i learns moving from hi to h
′
i is that he
chose at hi the unique action leading to h
′
i (hence, h
′
i is an immediate follower of hi in the
directed forest, given that player i has at least two actions at each information set).
For example, the bottom information set of player 2 in the left hand side of Figure 4 controls
the top information set.
Remark 1. Fix i ∈ I. Given an information set hi ∈ Hi and a feasible action a
⋆
i ∈ Fi(hi), it
is easily seen, due to perfect recall, that there is at most one h′i ∈ Hi following action a
⋆
i such
that hi ≪i h
′
i.
Definition 5. Given a player i ∈ I, a non-terminal history h ∈ H with i /∈ I(h), and a
nonempty subset di of some information set hi ∈ Hi, we say that di dominates h, written
h⋖i di,
whenever
Z(h) = Z(di).
In other words, h preceeds di and they have the same set of terminal successors. For
example, the two nodes on the right of the information set of player 3 in the first game tree
of Figure 5 dominate history (r), i.e., (r)⋖3 {(r, a), (r, b)}.
Remark 2. In the same spirit of Remark 1, fix h ∈ H and i ∈ I such that i is inactive at h.
Then it is easily seen that there is at most one nonempty set di ⊆ hi ∈ Hi such that h⋖i di.
With these notions at hand, we can define two invariant transformations, which are the
natural generalizations of the ones provided in Examples 1 and 2, respectively.
3.2. Coalescing Moves. We represent the so-called Coalescing Moves transformation (or,
simply, Coalescing) by the correspondence
γ : G ։ G,
and recall that its inverse correspondence is commonly known in the literature as Sequential
Agent Splitting. The domain dom(γ) := {G ∈ G : γ(G) 6= ∅} is the collection of all extensive
game structures G defined by (1) for which there exist i ∈ I and information sets hi,h
′
i ∈ Hi
such that h′i controls hi, that is, hi ≪i h
′
i.
For each G ∈ dom(γ) and hi,h
′
i ∈ Hi with hi ≪i h
′
i, we identity the game in γ(G)
corresponding to the pair (hi,h
′
i) with
γ(G;hi,h
′
i).
Denoting by a⋆i ∈ Fi(hi) the (unique) feasible action of the player i ∈ I for which (4) holds,
the transformed game
γ(G;hi,h
′
i) := 〈I˜ ,
˜¯H, (A˜i, H˜i)i∈I˜〉
7That is, hi precedes h
′
i in the directed forest if, for each h
′
∈ h
′
i there is h ∈ hi such that h ≺ h
′.
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is defined as follows:
• I˜ = I;
• ˜¯H coincides with H¯ for all histories h such that at least one of the following is satisfied:
(i) there exists h′ ∈ hi such that h  h
′;
(ii) h is unrelated to any h′ ∈ hi;
(iii) there exist h′ ∈ hi, ai ∈ Fi(h) \ {a
⋆
i }, and a−i ∈ F−i(h) with (h
′, (ai, a−i))  h.
In the remaining cases, each history h′ ∈ H¯ such that (h, (a⋆i , a−i))  h
′, for some
a−i ∈ F−i(h), has to be replaced in
˜¯H by h˜′ where the actions chosen by player i at
the histories in the information set h′i are shifted back replacing a
⋆
i ;
• A˜j = Aj for all j ∈ I;
• denoting with h˜ the history in γ(G;hi,h
′
i) corresponding to h ∈ H, we have
8
F˜i(h˜) = Fi(hi) ∪ Fi(h
′
i) \ {a
⋆
i }
for all h ∈ hi; otherwise F˜j(h˜) = Fj(h). The new information sets (H˜j)j∈I are modified
accordingly. In particular, hi and h
′
i are coalesced into h˜i. Moreover, new information
sets of players j ∈ I \ {i} who are active in the sub-trees with roots h ∈ hi are added,
so that they are not able to observe the choices made by player i at histories h˜ ∈ h˜i
among the feasible actions Fi(h
′
i); see, e.g., the information sets of player 3 in Figure
4 below.
1
2 2
z1 3 z2 3
2 2 2 2
z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8 z9 z10
ℓ r
a b a b
x y x y
p q p q p q p q
γ
=⇒
1
2 2
z1
3 3
z2
3 3
z3 z5 z4 z6 z7 z9 z8 z10
ℓ r
a
q
a
pp
q
x y x y x y x y
Figure 4. An example of the transformation “Coalescing” γ.
Intuitively, the Coalescing transformation shifts all the actions in a information set h′i of a
given player i backwards to another information set hi of i controlled by the first one. Note
that the histories in h˜′i corresponding to h
′
i may “disappear” if player i was the only active
8We recall by (2) that Fi(hi) ∩ Fi(h
′
i) = ∅.
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player in such histories. Note also that the equalities between action sets that appear in the
definition of Coalescing are best interpreted as isomorphisms, since the meaning of actions
such as p and q in Figure 4 is changed by the transformation. For example, choosing action p
on the right-hand side corresponds to choosing b and p on the left-hand side.
Lemma 2. Coalescing is an invariant transformation, that is, γ ∈ T .
Proof. Fix G ∈ dom(γ) and consider the transformed game γ(G;hi,h
′
i). For each player
j ∈ I \ {i}, there is an obvious isomorphism between S˜j and Sj . Moreover, there exist
a bijection fi : Si → S˜i and a bijection g : Z → Z˜ such that g(ζ(s)) = ζ˜(f(s)) for all
s ∈ S, where f(s) is the structurally reduced strategy profile (fj(sj))j∈J and fj(sj) := sj
for all j ∈ I \ {i}. This implies that rnZ(G) ≃ rnZ(γ(G;hi,h
′
i)), i.e., G and γ(G;hi,h
′
i) are
behaviorally equivalent. 
3.3. Interchanging/Simultanizing. We denote the Interchanging/Simultanizing trans-
formation by the correspondence
σ : G ։ G.
The domain dom(σ) := {G ∈ G : σ(G) 6= ∅} is the collection of all extensive game structures
G defined as in (1) for which there exist a history h ∈ H, a player i ∈ I, and an information
set hi ∈ Hi with a nonempty subset di such that h⋖i di, that is, di dominates h.
For each G ∈ dom(σ), h ∈ H and di ⊆ hi ∈ Hi with h⋖i di, we denote the game in σ(G)
corresponding to the pair (h,di) with σ(G;h,di), where the transformed game
σ(G;h,di) := 〈I˜ ,
˜¯H, (A˜i, H˜i)i∈I˜〉
is defined as follows:
• I˜ = I;
• ˜¯H coincides with H¯ for all histories h′ such that either h′  h or h′ is unrelated to h.
In the remaining cases, each history h′ ∈ H¯ such that h ≺ h′ has to be replaced in ˜¯H
by h˜′ where the actions chosen by player i at the histories in di are shifted back at the
last coordinate of h (this is possible since, as it been already observed after Definition
5, player i has to be inactive at h);
• A˜j = Aj for all j ∈ I;
• denoting with h˜′ the history in σ(G;h,di) corresponding to h
′ ∈ H, we have
F˜i(h˜) = Fi(di),
and F˜j(h˜′) = Fj(h
′) in all remaining cases. The new information sets (H˜j)j∈I are
modified accordingly. The position of the subset di ⊆ hi is shifted back at the last
coordinate of h, all the others do not change; see e.g. the information set of player 3
in Figure 5 below.
Intuitively, the Interchanging/Simultanizing transformation shifts all the actions in a subset
di of an information set hi of a player i backwards to another history h dominated by di (where
he is not active). In addition, as it is shown in Figure 5, di can be a proper subset of hi.
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1
2 2
3
m r
ℓ
3 3 3 3
a b a b
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8 z9 z10
x y x y x y x y x y
σ
=⇒
1
2 2,3
3
m r
ℓ
3 3
a b
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6
z7 z8 z9 z10x y x y x y
(a, x)
(a, y) (b, x)
(b, y)
Figure 5. An example of the transformation “Interchanging/Simultanizing” σ.
The extensive game structure in Figure 6 provides another illustrative example: shifting
back the two third-tier nodes of player 2 we get the extensive game structure in the right hand
side of Figure 5.
1
2 3
3
m r
ℓ
3 3 2 2
a b x y
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z9 z8 z10
x y x y x y a b a b
Figure 6. A σ-inverse of the game in the right hand side of Figure 5.
Note that the classical “Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves” transformation used in the
literature (such as the one represented in Figure 2) can be always obtained as follows: G and
G′ are related by “Interchanging” if G′ ∈ σ−1(G′′), for some G′′ ∈ σ(G).
Lemma 3. Interchanging/Simultanizing is an invariant transformation, that is, σ ∈ T .
Proof. Fix G ∈ dom(σ) and consider the transformed game σ(G;h,di). It follows by con-
struction that Sj is isomorphic to S˜j for all j ∈ I. In particular, Sj is isomorphic to S˜j
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for all j ∈ I, so that there exist bijections fj : Sj → S˜j and a bijection g : Z → Z˜ such
that g(ζ(s)) = ζ˜(f(s)) for all s ∈ S, where f(s) is the structurally reduced strategy profile
(fj(sj))j∈I . In particular, rnZ(G) ≃ rnZ(σ(G;h,di)), i.e., G and σ(G;h,di) are behaviorally
equivalent. 
Remark 3. It is immediate to see that the composition of invariant transformations is in-
variant. In particular, by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the compositions of transformations γ and
σ and their inverses are invariant. First, define
iso
∈ as inclusion up to isomorphisms. Then, a
transformation T : G ։ G with dom(T ) 6= ∅ is invariant provided that
∀G ∈ G,∀G′ ∈ T (G),∃n ∈ N0,∃ι1, . . . , ιn ∈ {γ, γ
−1, σ, σ−1}, G′
iso
∈ (ι1 ◦ · · · ◦ ιn)(G), (5)
where, by convention, (ι1 ◦ · · · ◦ ιn)(G) := {G} if n = 0.
4. Characterization of Behavioral Equivalence
Fix a game structure G ∈ G. Then we say that:
• G has a coalescing opportunity if we can find in G two information sets hi,h
′
i of
the same player i such that h′i controls hi, that is, G ∈ dom(γ);
• G has a simultanizing opportunity if we can find in G a non terminal history h and
a subset di of an information set of a player i (not active at h) such that di dominates
h, that is, G ∈ dom(σ);
• G is minimal if it has no coalescing or simultanizing opportunity, that is,
G ∈ Ĝ := G \ (dom(σ) ∪ dom(γ)).
In addition,
• A game structure G′ ∈ G is a reduction of G if there is a finite sequence of game
structures (G1, . . . , Gn), with n ∈ N such that G1 = G, Gn = G
′, and Gk+1 ∈
γ(Gk) ∪ σ(Gk) for each k = 1, . . . , n− 1; in particular, G is a reduction of G itself.
9
Note that, if we interpret γ and σ as binary relations on G (with Gγ G′ if G′ ∈ γ (G) and
GσG′ if G′ ∈ σ (G)) and let (γ ∪ σ)⋆ denote the transitive closure of relation γ ∪ σ, then G′
is a reduction of G if and only if G = G′ or G (γ ∪ σ)⋆G′.
With these premises, we are going to show in Lemma 5 below that each game structure
G ∈ G has a unique minimal reduction. Then our main result follows:
Theorem 1. For all extensive game structures G,G ∈ G, the following are equivalent:
(a1) G and G′ are behaviorally equivalent;
(a2) G and G′ have the same minimal reduction;
(a3) G and G′ have a common reduction, up to isomorphisms;
(a4) G can be transformed into G′, up to isomorphisms, through a (possibly empty) finite
chain of transformations γ and σ and their inverses.
9We use the term “reduction” because, for both transformations, the height of the tree decreases (in a weak
sense). In addition, note that transformation γ reduces strictly the sum of the cardinalities of the action sets
of the involved player.
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Before we prove our characterization, note that the order on which the two transformations
γ and σ are applied matters. Indeed, as we show in Example 4, it is possible that G ∈
dom(γ) ∩ dom(σ) and, at the same time, γ(G) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅.
Example 4. Consider the game structure G in left hand side of Figure 7. Transformation
σ may be applied to the subgame with root (t). However, considering that the bottom infor-
mation set of player 1, say h1, controls {(t)}, we may apply also the γ transformation, which
yields the game structure γ(G; {(t)},h1) in the right hand side of Figure 7. It can be checked
that σ cannot be applied to γ(G; {(t)},h1), that is, γ(G; {(t)},h1) /∈ dom(σ).
1
2
1 1
z5
z3 z4z1 z2
x y
a ba b
t u
γ
=⇒
1
2 2 z5
z2 z4z1 z3
a b u
x yx y
Figure 7. γ and σ are not independent.
While standard reduced normal forms defined in terms of payoffs do not allow the iden-
tification of a game tree, for Z-reduced normal forms we can instead identify an “essentially
unique” (that is, up to isomorphisms) minimal game structure. The next result consists in
obtaining such essentially unique game.
Lemma 4. Let Ĝ and Ĝ′ be two behaviorally equivalent minimal game structures. Then
Ĝ = Ĝ′, up to isomorphisms.
Proof. Let G0 be the set of extensive game structures that are behaviorally equivalent to Ĝ,
that is,
G0 :=
{
G ∈ G : rnZ(G) ≃ rnZ(Ĝ)
}
.
It is claimed that, up to isomorphisms, G0 ∩ Ĝ is a singleton.
Fix a minimal extensive game structure G0 ∈ G0 ∩ Ĝ. First, we claim that, up to isomor-
phisms, at the root of G0 there are the same active players as at the root of Ĝ with the same
feasible actions.
By Lemma 1, for each game G and for each player i, we can define a partition P⋆i of Si as
follows:
P⋆i := sup
{
Pi ∈ Part(Si) : {ζ˜(Pi × S−i) : Pi ∈ Pi} ∈ Part(Z)
}
. (6)
(Indeed, the above collection contains {Si}, hence it is nonempty.) In other words, P
⋆
i is the
finest partition of the set of structurally reduced strategies Si of player i which, independently
of the profile of strategies of the opponents s−i ∈ S−i, induces a partition of the terminal
histories through the map ζ˜. In particular, we will prove that, if i is active at ∅ (that is,
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i ∈ I(∅)), then the partitions of Si and Z correspond to his set of feasible actions Fi(∅);
whereas if i /∈ I(∅) the partitions of Si and Z are trivial.
For each player i ∈ I and information set hi ∈ Hi, define the partition
Pi(hi) := {Pi(hi, ai) : ai ∈ Fi(hi)} ∈ Part(Si(hi)), (7)
where Si(hi) denotes the set of structurally reduced strategies si ∈ Si which are consistent
with hi, and Pi(hi, ai) denotes the set of strategies si ∈ Si(hi) which select ai at hi. Note also
that Pi(hi) induces the following partition:
Zi(hi) :=
{
ζ˜(Pi(hi, ai)× S−i(hi)) : Pi(hi, ai) ∈ Pi(hi)
}
∈ Part(Z(hi)). (8)
In particular, |Zi(hi)| = |Pi(hi)| = |Fi(hi)|.
Claim 1. For each game G and for each player i, if i ∈ I(∅) then P⋆i 6= {Si}.
Proof. Since {∅} ∈ Hi, Si({∅}) = Si, and Z({∅}) = Z, we have by (7) and (8) that
Pi({∅}) ∈ Part(Si) and Zi({∅}) ∈ Part(Z). Hence |P
⋆
i | ≥ |Pi({∅})| = |Fi(∅)| ≥ 2. 
Claim 2. For each game G and for each player i, if P⋆i 6= {Si} then there exists hi ∈ Hi such
that Z(hi) = Z.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the lenght ℓ of the longest history of the game. If
the game has longest history ℓ = 1, then hi = {∅} and the thesis is obvious. Suppose that
the claim holds for all games such that the lenght of their longest history is at most ℓ ∈ N.
Then let G be a game structure such that the lenght of its longest history is ℓ+1. If i ∈ I(∅)
then, by Claim 1, Pi({∅}) 6= {Si} and Z({∅}) = Z.
Suppose now that i /∈ I(∅). In this case, let {h(1), . . . , h(k)} be the set of histories of lenght
1 of G, so that h(j) = (a), with a ∈
∏
ι∈I(∅) Fι(∅); also, for each j = 1, . . . , k, let G
(j) be the
“subgame” which starts at h(j) defined by restriction on the subtree with root h(j) (cutting
the information sets, if necessary). For each j = 1, . . . , k, the lenght of the longest history in
G(j) is at most ℓ, and by the induction hypothesis there exists a unique information set h
(j)
i
of i in G(j) for which Z(h
(j)
i ) = Z(h
(j)). Let {P1, . . . , Pm} ∈ Part(Si) be a partition of Si into
nonempty sets such that
{ζ˜(P1 × S−i), . . . , ζ˜(Pm × S−i)} ∈ Part(Z).
Also, for each j = 1, . . . , k, let S
(j)
−i be the set of profiles of structurally reduced strategies s−i ∈
S−i consistent with history h
(j). Then {ζ˜(P1 × S
(j)
−i ), . . . , ζ˜(Pm × S
(j)
−i )} ∈ Part(Z(h
(j))). It
follows that the union of all information sets h
(j)
i of the “subgames” G
(j) is a unique information
set of the original game G, so that Z(hi) =
⋃k
j=1 Z(h
(j)
i ) = Z. 
Claim 3. If P⋆i 6= {Si} in the minimal game G0 then i ∈ I(∅).
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that i /∈ I(∅) and P⋆i 6= {Si}. By Claim 2, there
exists hi ∈ Hi such that Z(hi) = Z. Since i /∈ I(∅), hi 6= {∅}; furthermore, hi dominates ∅.
It follows that there is a simultanizing opportunity at ∅. This contradicts the minimality of
G0. 
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It follows by Claims 1, 2, and 3 that a player i ∈ I is active at the root ∅ of G0 if and only
if P⋆i 6= {Si}. Then, we show that, if player i is active, his set of feasible actions Fi(∅) can
be labeled by the elements of P⋆i (cf. Example 5 for an illustrative example):
Claim 4. For each i ∈ I(∅) in the minimal game G0, we have |Fi(∅)| = |P
⋆
i |.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I(∅). By definition P⋆i is finer than Pi({∅}) (defined in Equation (7)), i.e.,
Pi({∅}) ≤ P
⋆
i and, in particular, 2 ≤ |Fi(∅)| ≤ |P
⋆
i |. Suppose by way of contradiction
that the second inequality is strict, i.e., Pi({∅}) 6= P
⋆
i . Then there exists a partition Pi ∈
Part(Si) such that {ζ˜(Pi × S−i) : Pi ∈ Pi} ∈ Part(Z) and Pi 6≤ Pi({∅}). In particular,
Pi 6= {Si}. However, by Lemma 1, Part(Si) is a complete lattice and there exists
P
′
i := sup{Pi({∅}),Pi} ∈ Part(Si).
As in the proof of Claim 2, let {h(1), . . . , h(k)} be the set of histories of lenght 1 of G0, so that
h(j) = (a), with a ∈
∏
ι∈I(∅) Fι(∅); similarly, for each j = 1, . . . , k, let G
(j)
0 be the “subgame”
which starts at h(j) defined by restriction on the subtree with root h(j) (cutting the information
sets, if necessary). Note that each G
(j)
0 must be minimal like G0 (indeed, if there were a
simultanizing or a coalescing opportunity in G
(j)
0 , there would be also in G0). Considering
that Pi({∅}) ≤ P
′
i, Pi({∅}) 6= P
′
i, and that {ζ˜(P
′
i × S−i) : P
′
i ∈ P
′
i} ∈ Part(Z), it follows
that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the partition of the corresponding “subgame” G
(j)
0
is not a singleton. Hence, by Claim 3, player i is active at the root of G
(j)
0 . Thus {∅} ≪i hi,
where hi is the information set of i containing h
(j). Therefore there is a coaleascing opportunity
at ∅. This contradicts the minimality of G0. 
It follows that G0 (hence, also Ĝ
′) has, up to isomorphisms, the same active players at the
root and the same feasible actions of Ĝ.
Then, for each i ∈ I, fix P ⋆i ∈ P
⋆
i . For each i ∈ I(∅), P
⋆
i identifies an action which is
feasible at ∅. For each i /∈ I(∅), P⋆i is the trivial partition by Claim 1, hence P
⋆
i = Si
indicates that no action is available at ∅. Notice that, with this, (P ⋆i )i∈I identifies an history
h of lenght 1. Consider the sub-Z-reduced normal form, where the set of strategies is restricted
to P ⋆i for each i ∈ I. Let Z
⋆ be the set of terminal histories consistent with
∏
j∈I P
⋆
j . With the
same argument as above, for each i ∈ I, there exists an unique partition P⋆⋆i of P
⋆
i defined
by
P⋆⋆i := sup
{
Pi ∈ Part(P
⋆
i ) : {ζ˜
(
Pi ×
∏
j∈I\{i} P
⋆
j
)
: Pi ∈ Pi} ∈ Part(Z
⋆)
}
.
Similarly, player j ∈ I is active at the history h if and only if P⋆⋆j 6= {P
⋆
j } and his set of
feasible actions Fj(h) can be labeled as the elements of P
⋆⋆
j . At this point, for each player i,
if two histories h′, h′′ of lenght ≤ 1 belong to the same information set of i, then they identify
the same partition P⋆⋆i (hence, by construction, the same feasible actions). Conversely, if
the histories h′, h′′ identify the same partition P⋆⋆i then by Claim 4 they belong to the same
information set.
This algorithm can be inductively repeated, relabeling all profiles of actions of G0 by profiles
of cells of partitions of each Si. By construction, with this relabeling, two histories h, h
′ are on
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a same information set of a player i if and only if Fi(h) = Fi(h
′). This allows to reconstruct
uniquely (that is, up to isomorphisms) the whole game structure G0, completing the proof. 
Lemma 5. Each extensive game structure G ∈ G has a unique minimal reduction, up to
isomorphisms.
Proof. Fix G ∈ G. First, we show that there exists a minimal game structure Ĝ which is
behaviorally equivalent to G. The game Ĝ is constructed by recursive application of trans-
formations γ and σ. The recursion is based on the length of histories that offer coalescing or
simultanizing opportunities. Recall that we consider only finite game structures; therefore, all
the collections defined below are finite as well.
Basis step. Consider the root ∅, that is, the only history of length 0. Define the set C0
made by all pairs ({∅},hi) such that {∅} ≪i hi (so that i ∈ I(∅) and {∅} ∈ Hi). Define also
the set S0 made by all pairs (∅,di) such that ∅⋖i di (so that i /∈ I(∅)). Of course, both sets
C0 and S0 are finite. Apply the transformation γ at all pairs ({∅},hi) ∈ C0; to be precise, enu-
merate the elements of C0 as ({∅}, w1), . . . , ({∅}, wk), in some order, and consider the finite
sequence of games γ(G; {∅}, w1), γ(γ(G; {∅}, w1); {∅}, w
′
2) (where ({∅}, w
′
2) is the pair cor-
responding to ({∅}, w2) in γ(G; {∅}, w1)), . . ., γ(· · · γ(γ(G; {∅}, w1); {∅}, w
′
2) · · · ; {∅}, w
′
k)
and note that the latter game does not depend on the chosen enumeration of C0. Then, sim-
ilarly, apply the transformation σ in the latter game at the corresponding pairs (∅,di) ∈ S0
and denote the obtained game by G(1) (where G(1) = G if both C0 and S0 are empty).
Note that, since all transformations are applied at the root of the game, all coalescing and
simultanizing opportunities are preserved at each transformation.
Induction Step. Suppose that G(n) has been defined for some positive integer n. Define
the set Cn made by all pairs (hi,h
′
i) of the game G(n) such that hi ≪i h
′
i and there exists
h ∈ hi with lenght n (in particular, i ∈ I(h)). Define also the set Sn made by all pairs (h,di)
of the game G(n) such that h⋖i di and h has lenght n (so that i /∈ I(h) for each such history
h). Apply the transformation γ at all pairs (hi,h
′
i) ∈ Cn. Then, apply the transformation σ
at all pairs (h,di) ∈ Sn and denote by G(n + 1) the obtained game (where G(n + 1) = G(n)
if both Cn and Sn are empty). Similarly, note that, since all transformation are applied at
the same height of G(n), all coalescing and simultanizing opportunities are preserved at each
transformation.
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, G(n) is behaviorally equivalent to G for every n ≥ 1. In
addition, since G is finite, there exists an integer n0 ≥ 1 such that G(n) = G(n0) for all
n ≥ n0. Set Ĝ := G(n0). We claim that Ĝ ∈ Ĝ. Let us suppose by contradiction that
Ĝ ∈ dom(γ), i.e., there exists a coalescing opportunity in Ĝ, let us say with hi ≪i h
′
i. Let k
be the minimal lenght of histories h ∈ hi and note that k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1}. This implies
that G(k + 1) has a coalescing oppurtinity at an information set with an history of lenght k,
which contradicts our costruction. With a similar argument, we have Ĝ /∈ dom(σ). Therefore
Ĝ is minimal, hence it is a reduction of G.
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To complete the proof, we need to show that Ĝ is the unique reduction of G, up to iso-
morphisms. Indeed, suppose that Ĝ′ is another minimal game structure which is behaviorally
equivalent to G. Then Ĝ and Ĝ′ are two behaviorally equivalent minimal game structures. It
follows from Lemma 4 that Ĝ = Ĝ′, up to isomorphisms. 
Example 5. Consider the game Ĝ ∈ Ĝ in the right hand side of Figure 7. Its Z-reduced
normal form is given in Figure 8.
1\2 x y
a z1 z3
b z2 z4
u z5 z5
Figure 8. rnZ(Ĝ) of the game in Figure 7.
It follows from the algorithm described in Lemma 4 that player 1 is active at the root ∅
with three feasible actions, whereas player 2 is inactive at ∅ because the unique partition
of {x, y} which divides the terminal paths in disjoint sets is {x, y} itself. At this point, for
the sub-games starting at the histories (a) and (b), player 2 is active and the finest partition
dividing the terminal paths in disjoint sets is {{x}, {y}}. It follows that player 2 is active at
such histories, they are on the same information set, and he has two available actions. Finally,
player 2 is inactive at the history (u). In other words, we constructed the game Ĝ whose
extensive game structure is represented in the right hand side of Figure 7.
We can thus provide a characterization of invariant transformations.
Lemma 6. A correspondence T : G ։ G with dom(T ) 6= ∅ is an invariant transformation if
and only if it satisfies (5).
Proof. By Remark 3, T contains all the correspondences T : G ։ G with dom(T ) 6= ∅ which
satisfy (5). Conversely, fix an invariant transformation T and an extensive game structure
G ∈ dom(T ) (which is possible, since dom(T ) 6= ∅). Then, for each G′ ∈ T (G), we have
that G is behaviorally equivalent to G′, i.e., rnZ(G) ≃ rnZ(G
′). By Lemma 4, there exist
unique minimal game structures Ĝ and Ĝ′ with Z-reduced normal forms rnZ(G) and rnZ(G
′),
respectively. It follows by Lemma 5 that Ĝ and Ĝ′ are the minimal reductions of G and G′,
respectively. Therefore there exist n, k ∈ N0 and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ {γ, σ} such that
Ĝ ∈ (ϕ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕn)(G) and Ĝ′ ∈ (ψ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ψk)(G
′).
This implies that G′
iso
∈ (ψ−1k ◦ · · · ◦ ψ
−1
1 ◦ ϕ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕn)(G), so that T satisfies (5). 
Finally, we are ready to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. (a1) ⇐⇒ (a2). The if part is clear. The only if part follows from
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
(a2) ⇐⇒ (a3). The only if part is clear. The if part follows from Lemma 5.
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(a1)⇐⇒ (a4). The if part is clear, cf. Remark 3. Conversely, if G is behaviorally equivalent
to G′ then there exists an invariant transformation T ∈ T such that G′ ∈ T (G). By Lemma
6, T : G ։ G is a correspondence with dom(T ) 6= ∅ satisfying (5). This means that there exist
n ∈ N and ι1, . . . , ιn ∈ {γ, γ
−1, σ, σ−1} such that G′
iso
∈ (ι1 ◦ · · · ◦ ιn)(G). This completes the
proof. 
4.1. Concluding remarks. The four transformations put forward by Thompson [28] are
the starting point for the development of many other equivalence relations. Some solution
concepts, like Nash equilibrium, iterated (weak or strict) dominance, and strategic stability
(Kohlberg and Mertens [12]) are invariant to transformations that preserve the reduced normal
form. Others, like subgame perfection or trembling hand perfection in the agent normal form
(Selten [26, 27]), are only invariant to Interchanging/Simultanizing. The latter is almost a
must if games are represented in the traditional way of Kuhn [15], which does not allow for a
direct representation of simultaneity, but not if the formalism allows for a direct representation
of simultaneity, as in our case. It is worth noting that some solution concepts, like weak
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Myerson [18], Mas Colell et al. [16]) are not even invariant to
Interchanging, as shown by Myerson [18, Figures 4.6 and 4.7].
We do not see different forms of invariance as strategic rationality requirements, but rather
as interesting properties that independently justified solution concepts may or may not sat-
isfy. In particular, different notions of extensive-form rationalizability with an independent
epistemic foundation are based on the notion of sequential best reply described in the In-
troduction, which applies to classes of behaviorally equivalent strategies. With this, we look
at transformations that preserve behavioral equivalence and prove that two simple invariant
transformations, i.e., Interchanging/Simultanizing and Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent
Splitting, are sufficient to characterize the notion of behavioral equivalence.
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